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COMMENTS
State Involvement in Private Discrimination
Under the Fourteenth Amendment
INTRODUCTION
The fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall "de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." In the Civil Rights Cases' the United
States Supreme Court made it clear that this amendment places
no restrictions on the acts of private individuals. 2 This decision
merely gave expression to the dichotomy implicit in the language
of the amendment. Accordingly, there are state acts, which may
or may not violate the fourteenth amendment, and there are
private acts which in no case violate the amendment. Despite
this superficially clear distinction the division between state
and private action still wants for precise definition more than
seventy-five years after the decision of the Civil Rights Cases.
To a large extent this is due to the abstract nature of the
state's being. Since it exists only in the minds of men, the state
cannot act itself, but must rely upon men to perform its func-
tions.3 This necessitates a separation of the acts of men which
are to be attributed to the state from those which are to remain
merely acts of private citizens. The task of deciding to whom a
particular act is to be attributed is made harder because it is
at times difficult to draw a clear distinction between acts au-
thorized by the state government and those which are simply
permitted under state law.4 A further complication of the cases
involving fourteenth amendment questions has been the fact
that the policy which guides the Supreme Court in expounding
1. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
2. The Court in the Civil Rights Cases drew upon the opinions of three prior
cases in its interpretation of the fourteenth amendment: Em parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339, 347 (1880) ("Whoever, by virtue of public position under a State
government [denies due process or equal protection] . . . violates the constitutional
inhibition."); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880) ("The provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment . . . all have reference to State action exclusively,
and not to any action of private individuals.") ; United States v. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542, 554 (1875) ("[The clauses of the amendment do not] add any thing
to the rights which one citizen has under the Constitution against another ...
The only obligation resting upon the United States is to see that the States do not
deny the right.").
3. See, e.g., PETRAZYCKI, LAW AND MORALITY (1955).
4. Cf. Comment, Race Discrimination in Housing, 57 YALE L.J. 426, 434
(1948), where it was suggested that "The difficulty in thinking of any private
rights independent of recogniton and protection by government, indicates that
'public' and 'private' are not separate compartments but titles for opposing ends
of a continuous spectrum."
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the Constitution dictates against rigid definition of such con-
cepts as those contained in the amendment. The flexibility of
the state action concept has played an important part in enlarg-
ing the ambit of protection of the fourteenth amendment.
However, it must be emphasized that the uncertainty attend-
ing an adjudication under the fourteenth amendment is not
necessarily eliminated by a determination of the state action
issue. For if it is found the state has acted, there remains the
further inquiry as to whether the act in question denied due
process or equal protection of the laws.
Despite these difficulties, there are certain areas of litigation
in which unconstitutional state action is fairly well defined.
Thus, it is definitely established that ministerial acts of the state
judiciary, 5 or acts of the state legislature, which contravene the
due process or equal protection guarantees are prohibited by the
fourteenth amendment. Later cases indicate that the amend-
ment prohibits not only discriminatory state statutes, but also
private acts in accordance with these statutes.7  Discriminatory
acts of state executive officers have been declared unconstitu-
tional, 8 whether the officer acted pursuant to state law,9 con-
5. Ew parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880) (state action found where a state
judge excluded Negroes from state juries).
6. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (unconstitutional state
statute provided that only white persons could serve as jurors). Cf. cases in-
validating city ordinances which attempt to zone residential property on the basis
of race: Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930) ; Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S.
668 (1927) ; Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
7. Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (unconstitutional state statute required
employers of five or more workers to hire at least eighty percent native-born
citizens of the United States). Cf. Flemming v. South Carolina Electric & Gas
Co., 224 F.2d 252 (4th Cir. 1956) (state action found where a bus driver required
a Negro to change seats in accordance with state law). There is also room for
strong argument that private organizations specially empowered by the state,
e.g., labor unions designated as collective bargaining agents, must abide by the
prohibitions of the amendment. For cases holding that a labor union, in deriving
its power to negotiate from Congress, must operate within the confines of the
fifth amendment: Syres v. Oil Workers International Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) ;
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952) ; Steele v. Louis-
ville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); James v. Marinship Corp., 25
Cal.2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944) ; Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831
(1940).
8. It should be noted that the definition of state action as discussed in this
Comment is not controlling for purposes of defining the restrictions placed upon
suits against a state by the eleventh amendment. E.r parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1907) established that the federal courts can protect the constitutional rights of
persons under the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments where these rights are
impaired by state officers. The theory is that assertion of these rights against
the officers is not a suit against the state, but one against individuals who are
acting beyond their authortiy. However, these acts, because committed under color
of state law, fall within the ambit of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments.
9. E.g., Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932) (Governor of Texas en-
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trary to state law,'0 or whether he improperly enforced a valid
state law."
The purpose of this Comment is the analysis of problems
created by the employment of the state action concept in three
areas of difficulty. Discussed first will be state enforcement
of private discrimination. The primary inquiry here is what
state act constitutes a denial of due process or equal protection
under the fourteenth amendment. The two other areas deal with
state inaction and state proprietary involvement in private dis-
crimination. In these areas the major question is what con-
stitutes state action.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS RESULTING FROM STATE
ENFORCEMENT OF PRIVATE DISCRIMINATION
Prior to the Shelley v. Kraemer'2 decision in 1948 it was
generally believed that judicial enforcement of private discrimi-
nation did not constitute state action.'3 Although the case of
Marsh v. Alaban' 4 has been explained as an earlier recognition
that state court enforcement of private discrimination is uncon-
stitutional,' 5 this holding does not appear to have been expressed
in the opinion. In the Marsh case the Supreme Court reversed
joined from enforcing confiscatory regulations of oil production); E parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1907) (federal court could enjoin state executive officer
from enforcing state railroad rate statute). Cf. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103,
113 (1935).
10. See Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951) (private detective who
flashed a special badge issued him and was accompanied by a policeman acted
"under color" of state law in obtaining confessions by beating suspects) ; Screws
v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (acts of a sheriff who beat a prisoner in
violation of his duties under state law, thereby causing his death, were state
action). See also Crews v. United States, 169 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1947) ; Valle
v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1949) ; Apodaca v. United States, 188 F.2d
932 (10th Cir. 1941). But see Watkins v. Oaklawn Jockey Club, 183 F.2d 440
(8th Cir. 1950) (public officers who were hired by private company and who
were not purporting to act as police officers were not acting under color of
Arkansas law).
11. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (invalidated municipal ordinance
valid on its face but applied discriminatorily against Chinese) ; Neal v. Delaware,
103 U.S. 370 (1880) (systematic exclusion of Negroes from state juries).
12. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See also the companion case of Hurd v. Hodge, 334
U.S. 24 (1948) (a decision under federal statute invalidating enforcement of
racial covenant by lower federal court in District of Columbia).
13. See, e.g., Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal.,680, 186 Pac. 596
(1920) ; Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915).
But see Grandolfo v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181 (S.D. Cal. 1892).
14. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). See Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946) (com-
panion case).
15. E.g., Horowitz, Misleading Search for State Action, 30 So. CALIF. L. REV.
208, 217 (1957); Note, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1216, 1218 (1960), noting State v.
Williams, 37 CCH Lab. Cas. 65708 (Balt. Crim. Ct. 1959).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the trespass conviction of a Jehovah's Witness who was arrested
for handing out religious tracts on the streets of a company town
contrary to the wishes of its owner. The Court did not specify
exactly what conduct was found to be constitutionally objection-
able, but chose instead to place significance on the rights that
had been denied. It was stated that the first amendment free-
doms of speech and religion of the Witness had been unjusti-
fiably impaired, the Court intimating that free speech had also
been denied by preventing communications to the citizenry of
the town. In addition the Court noted that the street appeared
to be one on which free speech could be practiced and that the
company, by holding the property open to public use, had suf-
fered a diminution in its rights to enforce private discrimination.
With no express language to the effect, it would seem unreason-
able to conclude that the Marsh opinion amounted to a holding
based primarily on judicial enforcement of private discrimina-
tion. Rather, the decision would appear to be more dependent
upon the special facts of the case than upon any far-reaching
state action doctrine.
The Shelley case joined for review two identical state court
decisions. 6 In both instances Negroes had purchased and taken
possession of property subject to a covenant which forbade its
purchase or occupancy by Negroes. The state court in each case
upheld the restrictive covenant and ordered the Negroes off the
property. The Supreme Court held that a state court's enforce-
ment of a racially restrictive covenant was a violation of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. This hold-
ing makes it clear that state enforcement of private acts con-
stitutes state action. Thus the new basis for inquiry is whether
the state action in enforcing a particular private discrimination
amounts to a denial of equal protection.
Since the decision in Shelley v. Kraemer the Court has con-
sidered only one case in this area. In Barrows v. Jackson17 the
Court affirmed a California decision denying a suit for dam-
ages resulting from the breach of a racially restrictive covenant.
This case, in which the author of the Shelley opinion dissented,
does little more than invalidate an alternate method of judicial
enforcement of racial covenants. Consequently, the precise limits
16. Sipes v. McGhee, 316 Mich. 614, 25 N.W.2d 638 (1947) ; Kraemer v.
Shelley, 355 Mo. 814, 198 S.W.2d 679 (1947). -
17. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
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of the Shelley decision have not been drawn by the Supreme
Court.
Under the fourteenth amendment a denial of equal protection
occurs when the state makes an unreasonable's distinction in
the promulgation or application of its laws. From Brown v.
Board of Education9 and its progeny 20 it is now clear that a
distinction drawn solely on the basis of race is unreasonable
and thus unconstitutional. Because Shelley v. Kraemer held that
a state court enforcement of a racial covenant denied equal
protection, there is some basis for saying that this case stands
for the proposition that state enforcement of private racial dis-
crimination amounts to the drawing of an unreasonable, and
therefore unconstitutional, distinction by the state.2 '
However, because the state court in Shelley did not draw the
initial distinction, but merely enforced the racial discrimination
of a private person, this case is not completely analogous to one
where the state has required school attendance to be on a racially
segregated basis or in some other way acted pursuant to its
own racial distinction. It would seem that a valid rationale of
the Shelley decision could be set forth which would not result
in counting every enforcement of a private discriminatory act
as being a denial of equal protection. This rationale has been
derived by comparing the facts of the Shelley case with those
presented in several later state court cases.
In Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery2 2 the Iowa court enforced a
racially discriminatory exclusion clause in a burial contract
18. E.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) . "The
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment does not take from the state
the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise
of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when
it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary."
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). (com-
panion case).
20. E.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Association v. Detiege, 252
F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958), aff'd, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) ; Dawson v. Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955), aff'd, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) ;
Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956), aff'd, 325 U.S. 903 (1956).
21. Of. Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292, 300 (1956) (dissenting
opinion). In the Black case the California court refused to reinstate a communist
employee. The majority of the Supreme Court dismissed the case on the ground
that no substantial federal question was presented. But the dissenting opinion
found that the California court approved of the employee's dismissal because she
was a communist and said that this violated the first amendment guarantees of
the employee under the fourteenth amendment, citing Shelley v. Kraemer.
22. 349 U.S. 70 (1955). In this case the Court initially granted certiorari,
but was evenly divided on the initial hearing of the case. On rehearing, the Court
took notice that Iowa had passed a statute after the case arose which did not
affect the question presented, but presumably prevented its recurrence in the
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against the widow of a Winnebago Indian. The suit was brought
for breach of contract after the cemetery refused to bury the
deceased because he was not a Caucasian. The state court in
Gordon v. Gordon23 enforced a religiously discriminatory condi-
tion included in a private trust. An heir, otherwise entitled to
participate in the benefits of the trust, was excluded because
he had married a gentile contrary to the terms provided by the
testator. The same year another state court enforced the rever-
sion of property donated for a public park pursuant to a racially
discriminatory reversion clause. 24 The donor had provided that
the property should revert to his ownership if ever it were sub-
jected to use by Negroes. In the.Girard 5 case the Pennsylvania
court enforced the racial discrimination of the directors of a
private trust. Negroes were refused admittance to a private
school administered by the trust.
In the Shelley case and in each of the state cases discussed
the interest in equality of the party discriminated against was
opposed by the discriminating party's interest of freedom in the
use of private property. The Shelley decision makes it clear that
the free use of property will not be protected at the expense of
equality where the property owner seeks to enforce a racial
covenant. However, the state cases, which do not involve the
enforcement of restrictive covenants, differ from the Shelley
case both analytically and practically.
It would seem that the difference in theory is that Shelley,
unlike the state cases, presented a state court enforcement of
a contract to practice racial discrimination. Since a binding con-
tract has the force of law between the parties, it would appear
that it should be subject to the same constitutional scrutiny by
the courts as is the law enacted by the legislature. Therefore,
if the law enforced by the court, whether contractual or public,
draws an unreasonable distinction, e.g., one based on race alone,
the enforcement of such a law should be a denial of equal pro-
tection under the fourteenth amendment. However, the above
state cases do not enforce contracts to discriminate but merely
State of Iowa. On this basis, the Court, feeling a federal question of substance
had not been presented, dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.
23. 332 Mass. 193, 124 N.E.2d 226 (1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955).
See United States National Bank of Portland v. Snodgrass, 202 Ore, 530, 275
P.2d 860 (1954).
24. Charlotte Park and Recreation Commission v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88
S.E.2d 114 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956).
25. In re Girard College Trusteeship, 231 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844 (1958), cert.
Alenied, 357 U.S. 570 (1958).
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protect the voluntary indulgence in racial discrimination by an
individual in the disposition of private property. Thus it would
seem these cases do not constitute enforcement of unreasonable
law but are instead illustrations of the protection of a desirable
privilege. To hold otherwise, it seems, would effect an unwar-
ranted restriction of the freedom traditionally thought to be in-
herent in the enjoyment of private property.
Perhaps the difference between the Shelley case and the state
cases discussed is more easily seen in effect than in theory. In
the Shelley case the Negroes acquired property from a willing
vendor, thus making it impossible for the other covenanting
parties to effectuate their discriminatory desires without the
assistance of the state. In the later cases the discrimination was
at least potentially successful without soliciting the aid of the
state tribunal.
The state court decisions reviewed in Shelley v. Kraemer
necessarily took cognizance of a racial distinction in enforcing
the restrictive covenants. But in the other state cases the courts
merely recognized the right to exercise freedom of choice in the
disposition of property.
Even more important from the practical standpoint is the
fact that in Shelley the enforcement of the restrictive covenant
in the state courts had consequences extending far beyond the
parties to the discriminatory agreement. The enforcement of
racially restrictive covenants would conceivably permit the ac-
complishment of residential zoning on a racial basis through
state enforcement of private agreements. The Supreme Court,
in Buchanan v. Warley,26 declared residential zoning on the
basis of race to be unconstitutional when achieved by a city
ordinance. On the other hand, it would seem the voluntary re-
fusal of a property owner to sell property on the basis of race
is less objectionable than the organized withholding of property
from certain races that is compelled by statute or contract.
Because the uncoerced refusal to sell property to a non-Caucasian
is largely discretionary and therefore subject to change, it would
seem that such a deprival does not pose nearly as great a threat
to the interests of minority classes as does the enforceable
covenant or statute. If the distinction between the enforcement
of private agreements to discriminate and the vindication of
26. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
19611
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
autonomous discrimination is unclear in theory, it seems suf-
ficiently apparent in the practical results reached in each case.
Discovering the true meaning of Shelley v. Kraemer assumes
added importance in view of the recent advent of the Negro
"sit-in" demonstrations. Within the past year the practice of
sitting at lunch counters on private property in protest of a
local custom of no service to Negroes has gained national atten-
tion on numerous occasionsY.2  In some instances the Negroes
have been arrested and convicted under the state trespass laws.2
Whether enforcement by the state court of the trespass statute
to aid private businesses to discriminate solely on the basis of
race amounts to a denial of equal protection of the laws is largely
an untried and unsettled question. 29
Of course if the rule of Shelley v. Kraemer prohibits state
enforcement of all private acts of discrimination, then the arrest
and conviction of Negro "sitters-in" under state trespass laws are
likely to be unconstitutional. However, under the analysis set
forth in this discussion sit-in activity would not be spared from
the operation of state trespass laws, as the enforcement of such
a law does not involve the enforcement of a contract to dis-
criminate on an unreasonable basis. The state law would be
invoked simply to give effect to the private property owner's
voluntary choice not to serve people of a particular race.30
Although under the instant analysis the operation of tres-
pass statutes against sit-in demonstrators does not come within
the ambit of the Shelley holding, it is possible that protection of
27. See Pollitt, Dime Store Demonstrations: Events and Legal Problems of
First Sixty Days, 1960 DUicE L.J. 315.
28. State v. Cooke, 248 N.C. 485, 103 S.E.2d 846 (1958) (Negroes convicted
for unlawful entry upon a golf course); State v. Clyburn, 247 N.C. 455, 101
S.E.2d 295 (1958) (Negroes convicted for refusal to leave portion of building set
aside for white patrons only). Cf. Chicago v. Corney, 142 N.E.2d 160 (Ill. App.
1957) (anti-discrimination statute gave defendants a right, superior to the rights
of the owners of a tavern, to enter and wait for service).
29. Compare Pollitt, Dime Store Demonstrations: Events and Legal Problems
of First Sixty Days, 1960 DuKE L.J. 315, for a discussion of the legality of other
retaliatory tactics used against the sit-in demonstration, e.g., boycott laws, breach
of peace laws, and school expulsion.
30. The right to deny service was recognized by the English common law.
Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. 838, 153 Eng. Rep. 351 (1845). The United
States Supreme Court adopted this view in Marrone v. Washington Jockey Club,
227 U.S. 633 (1913). Such is presently the law except in the twenty-six states
that recently enacted anti-discrimination laws. See GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS
ANn AMERICAN LAW 101 (1959). Recent cases vindicating the private restaurant
owner's right to deny service include: Williams v. Howard Johnson's Restaurant,
268 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1959) ; Slack v. Atlantic White Tower System, Inc., 181
F. Supp. 124 (D. Md. 1960).
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certain forms of this activity may be included under the aegis
of the holding in Marsh v. Alabama. The facts presented by the
typical sit-in case are in several ways similar to those in the
Marsh case. In both, a form of peaceful practice of speech is
terminated by the enforcement of state trespass laws. Private
property more or less open to public use is the scene of the
suppression in each case. However, it is arguable that the cir-
cumstances of the typical sit-in demonstration do not present
as strong a demand for constitutional protection of minority
rights as do those of the Marsh case. In the first place, the
curtailment of lunch counter demonstrations amounts to little
more than a negligible infringement of the demonstrator's right
to free speech. He may propound his views in the streets as
did the Jehovah's Witness in the Marsh case.3' It is probably
true that presently no means of dissemination provides the
Negro a method of capturing public attention as effectively as
does the sit-in demonstration. However, even the protection of
free speech must be tempered by the consideration of other
highly regarded interests.3 2 Consequently, the law cannot always
guarantee the most effective forum to one who proposes to exer-
cise the right of free speech.8 3 The lunch counter demonstrators,
as other inhabitants of this country, would appear entitled only
to an adequate opportunity to voice their ideas.
More important than the speech dissimilarities is the smaller
degree to which private property such as a dime store is open
to public use as compared to a company town. In Marsh the
Court placed much significance on the fact that the Witness
was justified in believing she had a right to proselytize on the
company town streets because one has a constitutional right to
speak in the public streets.24 But a private store is open for
limited hours and invitation to enter is extended only for pur-
poses conducive to the economic interest of the proprietor. No
31. See Follet v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) ; Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 (1943) ; Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943) ; Jamison v. Texas,
318 U.S. 413 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) ; Thornhill
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) ; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) ; Hague
v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) ; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
32. See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
33. See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) ; Martin v. Struthers, 319
U.S. 141, 147 (1943) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) ; Watch.
tower Bible & Tract Society v. Metropolitan Insurance Co., 297 N.Y. 339, 79
N.E.2d 433 (1948) ; Hall v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 72, 49 S.E.2d 369 (1948),
appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 875 (1948).
34. See note 31 supra.
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one is justified in assuming he has a constitutional right to
receive service or remain against the owner's will1 5
The arguments against analogizing the typical sit-in situa-
tion to the Marsh case are, however, not as compelling when
applied to other forms of activity which may be classified
loosely as sit-in demonstrations. Perhaps the case most closely
resembling the Marsh fact situation would be that of picketing
on the sidewalks of a private shopping center.3 6 In such a situa-
tion both the variables of free speech and public dedication
seem to be more in the demonstrator's favor. By ignoring the
prominent free speech element in Marsh v. Alabama it would
seem possible to extend its holding even farther to situations
which present primarily a use of private property which has
been effectively dedicated to public use. Likely activities falling
within this category would include demonstrations of the sit-in
variety in privately owned hotels or restaurants which essen-
tially purport to serve the travelling public. Such an extension
would appear, however, to be subject to the same criticism that
may be directed at the Marsh holding, without enjoying any of
its major virtues. Thus protection of sit-in activity in such situa-
tions, as the Marsh decision, would appear to present undesirable
government intervention in private affairs with only the stop-
gap requirement of public dedication barring further imposi-
tions. But unlike Marsh, the protection of an important free
speech interest is lacking in the protection of sit-in activity in
hotels and restaurants.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS RESULTING FROM STATE
PROPRIETARY INVOLVEMENT IN PRIVATE DISCRIMINATION
Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in the Civil Rights Cases37 pro-
posed a theory whereby very little involvement of the state
government in private affairs would cause those affairs to
become public for purposes of the fourteenth amendment. Al-
though the Supreme Court has since remained silent on this
issue, the state and lower federal courts have required that a
substantial involvement be established between the state and a
private agency for the acts of the private agency to constitute
state action. But as yet no formula has evolved whereby it may
35. See notes 28 and 30 supra.
36. See State v. Williams, 37 CCH Lab. Cas. 65708 (Bait. Crim. Ct. 1959),
noted in 73 HAMv. L. REV. 1216 (1960).
37. 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883).
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be determined exactly what degree and kind of involvement will
be deemed substantial.
The cases abound with tests, most of which have little ap-
plication beyond their own particular fact situations. Neverthe-
less, there is discernible a pattern of emphasis upon certain
factors in the opinions, the most frequently discussed being state
control of the private enterprise. Indeed it would seem that
the courts' inquiries in these cases, when expressed, are directed
generally toward whether the private enterprise is substantially
controlled by the state. But again the meaning of "substantial"
is not precisely defined and would seem to vary from court to
court.
The federal court of appeals in Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free
Library38 reversed a federal district court which found no state
action where a privately operated library refused a Negro ad-
mission to a library training class. Although the library was
administered by a private board of governors the court of ap-
peals found the City of Baltimore exerted substantial control
over the library's operation by regulatory requirements pre-
sumably attached to large subsidies received annually by the
library from the city. Later cases indicate that state aid alone
will not cause the private agency's acts to come within the ambit
of the fourteenth amendment, but that there must be de facto
control over the operations of the private agent.39
38. 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945).
39. In Eaton v. Board of Managers, 261 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1958), there was
no state action where a hospital excluded Negro physicians from courtesy staff
privileges even though the land upon which the hospital building stood was donated
by the city. The Kerr case was distinguished on the basis of lack of control in
this case. In Hackley v. Art Builders, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 851, 857 (D. Md.
1960), developers of a private housing project could deal with whom they pleased
and their decision not to sell to Negroes was not state action because of benefits
received from the state metropolitan commission. The opinion stated: "The only
case to the contrary, Ming v. Hogan, Sup. Ct. Sacramento, Cal., 3 Race Rel. L.
Rep. 693, is not legally persuasive. If the rule contended for by plaintiffs were
adopted, where should the line be drawn? Every business, every property owner
receives various services from the State and Federal Governments, many of them
at less than cost." In Mitchell v. Boys Club of Metropolitan Police, D.C., 157
F. Supp. 101 (D.D.C. 1957), no state action was found, although the club virtually
owed its existence to the police department, which volunteered policemen's services
while on duty to raise funds and work with the children. The city also donated
the use of public buildings and utilities. In this case the court flatly stated:
"Government control is the decisive factor in the determination of whether a
corporation is public or private and governmental control of the club does not
exist." Id. at 108. In Norris v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 78 F.
Supp. 451 (D. Mo. 1948), in a situation similar to the Kerr case, involving a
mechanical and fine arts college, it was held that there was no state action be-
cause there was no governmental control. In Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp.,
299 N.Y. 519, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950), no state
1961]
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However, what seems to be presumptive weight of substantial
control has been given two other factors. Thus it appears that
where the state collusively uses a private party as an agent to
achieve an unconstitutional end, or where the state purports to
provide a public service by procuring a private party to operate
a business on government property, the acts of the private person
will constitute state action.
One situation where courts have declared the acts of private
parties to be unconstitutional state action is where a city has
collusively leased a public swimming pool in order to avoid ad-
mitting Negroes. 40 A like result has been reached where a city
leased its golf course 4' and where a state leased one of its parks42
in order to avoid use by Negroes. On the other hand, racial dis-
crimination has been held constitutional when practiced by a
private party who acquired property from the state pursuant
to a bona fide lease4" or sale.44 It should be noted that in these
collusive leasing cases it is at least arguable that the act of the
state in leasing the property is the state action, not the act of
the party to whom the pool, golf course, etc., is leased. 45 Never-
theless, under this interpretation the finding of collusion is still
of paramount importance.
A state by awarding a restaurant concession in its air
terminal undertakes to provide a service to the public on its
property. Accordingly, discriminatory conduct by such con-
cessionaries has been declared unconstitutional. 46 The discrimi-
action even though the state had used power of eminent domain to get property
to convey to Stuyvesant and had granted the corporation a twenty-five year tax
exemption.
40. Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. W. Va. 1948) ; Culver v.
Warren, 84 Ohio App. 373, 83 N.E.2d 82 (1948). Cf. Kern v. City Commissioners
of Newton, 151 Kan. 565, 100 P.2d 709 (1940).
41. City of Greensboro v. Simkins, 246 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1957).
42. Department of Conservation v. Tate, 231 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1956).
43. Easterly v. Dempster, 112 F. Supp. 214 (E.D. Tenn. 1953) (bona fide
lease of golf course to relieve the city of financial burden) ; Harris v. City of
St. Louis, 233 Mo. App. 911, 111 S.W.2d 995 (1938) (valid lease of city audi-
torium).
44. Tomkins v. City of Greensboro, 276 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1960) (bona fide
sale of city swimming pool).
45. See Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Association, 347 U.S. 971 (1954).
The court of appeals decision which held that acts of a part-time lessee of city
amphitheatre were not state action was vacated and remanded for consideration
in the light of Brown v. Board of Education, although the court of appeals had
found no collusion.
46. Coke v. City of Atlanta, 184 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Ga. 1960). Cf. Anderson
v. Moses, 185 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (concession of a tavern in New
York's Central Park) ; Nash v. Air Terminal Services, 85 F. Supp. 545 (E.D.
Va. 1949) (federal air terminal).
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natory operation of a cafeteria in a court house building47 and
the segregated management of a theatre in a city hall building '
have been enjoined by federal district courts. In Boman v.
Birmingham Transit Co. 49 the federal court of appeals held 'that
the segregation of passengers by a carrier franchised to operate
on the streets of Birmingham was unconstitutional. An inter-
esting Delaware case was presented in Wilmington Parking
Authority v. Burton,5 0 where the lessee of building space in a
state operated parking facility refused a Negro service in his
private restaurant. The court's holding of no state action seems
correct in that the Authority by leasing to the tenant did not
intend to provide the public with restaurant service but merely
sought to obtain revenue essential to the continued operation
of the parking installation.
In summary, it would appear that where the state is involved
in a private discriminatory act the courts will consider certain
factors in deciding whether to invalidate the act under the four-
teenth amendment. It would seem that substantial state control
is the primary factor in bringing the private act under the ambit
of the fourteenth amendment. Apparently, substantial state con-
trol may be established by a preponderance of evidence, but pre-
sumptive weight will be given collusionary agency with the state
or an agency by which the state purports to provide a public
service.
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND
STATE INACTION
The opinion in the Civil Rights Cases contains language
which suggests that the fourteenth amendment can be violated
by the state's failure affirmatively to protect individuals against
private deprivations:
"Civil rights . . .cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts
of individuals, unsupported by state authority in the shape
of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings. [A pri-
vate deprivation] if not sanctioned in some way by the state
[does not deprive a citizen of his rights].""' (Emphasis
added.)
47. Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353
U.S. 924 (1956).
48. Jones v. Marva Theatres, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 49 (D. Md. 1960).
49. 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960).
50. 157 A.2d 894 (Del. 1960), appeal to United States Supreme Court pend-
ing. See 81 Sup. Ct. 52 (1960).
51. 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883).
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While this possibility seems to have been ignored and impliedly
refuted thereafter by the Supreme Court,5 2 several federal court
of appeals cases discuss the constitutional implications of a state
officer's failure affirmatively to protect an individual against
the harmful acts of third persons.
Thus in Cattlette v. United States53 the court, after finding
that a deputy sheriff was punishable under a federal statute
for his active participation in the abusive treatment of a group
of Jehovah's Witnesses, announced this opinion:
"It is true that a denial of equal protection has hitherto been
largely confined to affirmative acts of discrimination. The
Supreme Court, however, has already taken the position that
culpable official state inaction may also constitute a denial
of equal protection. '54
However, even as dicta, this statement appears too broad to
find support in the cases cited as its authority. 5 Nevertheless,
the language was repeated in Lynch v. United States56 where the
court affirmed the conviction of two state police officers for
releasing prisoners in their custody to a hooded mob with the
wilful intent that the prisoners should be beaten by the mob.
The case of Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R57 involved a suit for
damages against a railroad and public officers of two states for
illegal extradition of plaintiffs. The district court was found to
have erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' damage suit against a
Pennsylvania justice of the peace for refusing them a hearing
upon their arrest prior to extradition to New York. The court of
appeals, however, in stating plaintiff's possible cause of action
52. E.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948) : "[T]he restrictive agree-
ments standing alone cannot be regarded as violative of any rights guaranteed to
petitioners by the fourteenth amendment. So long as the purposes of those agree-
ments are effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms, it would appear clear
that there has been no action by the state and the provisions of the amendment
have not been violated." Cf. Williams v. Howard Johnson's Restaurant, 268 F.2d
845, 848 (4th Cir. 1959), where the court cited Shelley v. Kraemer and stated:
"The customs of the people of a state do not constitute state action within the
prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment."
53. 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943).
54. Id. at 907.
55. In Missouri em rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), it was un-
constitutional discrimination for Missouri to provide legal educational facilities
within the state for Caucasians only. This would seem to be clearly affirmative
discrimination. In McCabe v. A., T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914), allegations
in suit contesting the Separate Coach Law of Oklahoma were held to be too
vague and indefinite to warrant the relief sought by complainants.
56. 189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1951).
57. 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945).
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seems to rely on the possible affirmative acts of the justice of
the peace:
"The refusal of a state officer to perform a duty imposed
upon him by the law of his state because he has conspired
with others in a conscious design to deprive a person of civil
rights... may be... action taken 'under the color' of the law
of the state."58 (Emphasis added.)
Therefore, in the Cattlette and Lynch cases where the court
talks in terms of state inaction the facts of the cases display
affirmative action; and in the Picking case where the facts may
be said to illustrate state inaction, the theory of the cause of
action is expressed in affirmative terms. Furthermore, the state
inaction theory, stated or implied in these cases, has not been
followed, so that, apparently, a holding under the fourteenth
amendment has yet to be grounded squarely on a state's refusal
to render affirmative protection against private deprivations.
In contrast, it would seem that the fifteenth amendment does
require the state to take affirmative action in making certain
that none of its citizens are denied the right to cast an effective
ballot because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
In the white primary cases 59 the Supreme Court fashioned a
theory whereby a state is prohibited from allowing a political
party which has acquired hegemony to refuse Negroes the right
to vote in their private elections. But it would seem that such
a theory would have little effect on the prohibition against the
state under the fourteenth amendment6 ° The fifteenth amend-
ment would seem to be a narrower and more specific restriction
of state power than the fourteenth. For this reason a far-reach-
ing analogy between the two amendments concerning the concept
of state action would appear to be somewhat incautious.
In summary it may be said that although the Civil Rights
Cases suggests that the fourteenth amendment may prohibit
58. Id. at 250.
59. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) ; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944) Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935) ; Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73
(1932) ; Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) ; Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387
(4th Cir. 1947). Cf. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 81 Sup. Ct. 125 (1960). In this case
Negro voters who were removed from the city by a local act which altered the
shape of the city from a square to a twenty-eight sided figure had a cause of action
under the fifteenth amendment.
60. See Slack v. Atlantic White Tower System, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 124, 129
(D. Md. 1960), where a Negro sued a restaurant for denial of service. The court
stated: "The distinction between holding a primary election and operating a restau-
rant is obvious, and has always been recognized by the courts."
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state inaction as well as state action, this idea has not been
adopted by the federal courts; and that no analogy between the
fifteenth and fourteenth amendments should be drawn concern-
ing state inaction.
CONCLUSION
In deciding cases involving racial controversy under the
fourteenth amendment the Supreme Court has not formulated
precise rules of law. Such caution would appear desirable where
individual rights are newly involved in litigation. But it would
seem that when a sufficient amount of jurisprudence has been
developed, the formulation of rules is desirable and even neces-
sary if justice is to be done. This Comment does not presume
to decide when the time is ripe for laying down rules under
the fourteenth amendment but merely purports to provide
analysis and suggestions toward this end in cases where the
state is involved in private discrimination.
Where the state is involved in a proprietary manner with
the person committing the private discriminatory act, the re-
quirement of substantial state control would appear to be a fair
rule and one in line with the lower federal court decisions.
In cases where the state has given effect to private discrimi-
nation, the best rule would appear to be that, in order to find a
violation of the fourteenth amendment, the private racial dis-
tinction enforced by the state must have been drawn by a con-
tract to discriminate. Mere voluntary and isolated acts of
discrimination do not appear to present a sufficient threat to
minority interests to warrant the diminution of property inter-
ests that would necessarily result if the minority interests were
afforded unlimited protection.
The idea that a state may violate the fourteenth amendment
by its inaction alone would not appear to be justified by any
sound judicial interpretation of the amendment. The conclusion
that such a theory is non-existent is strengthened by the Su-
preme Court's opinions which appear implicitly to reject the
idea. It is submitted that such a position is desirable because
the adoption of the contrary position would result in an un-
warranted extension of governmental intervention under the
fourteenth amendment.
James L. Dennis
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